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CORPORATIONS-ALLOCATION OF SUBSIDIARY'S TAX BENEFIT FROM 
CoNSOLIDATED RETURN-Defendant parent corporation received from its 
subsidiary 3,556,992 dollars in tax benefits which had accrued to the sub-
sidiary from filing a consolidated income tax return.1 By agreement between 
parent and subsidiary, the profit-making corporation was to pay the losing 
corporation the savings created by the consolidated return. The working 
relationship of the two assured the subsidiary profits and the parent losses.2 
Consequently, nearly all tax benefit inevitably flowed to the parent.8 
Plaintiffs, the subsidiary's minority stockholders, sought a refunding of 
benefits allocated to defendant, claiming that the agreement was unfair and 
alleging that the defendant, as the subsidiary's majority shareholder, had 
violated its fiduciary obligation to minority shareholders. The Supreme 
Court, finding no violation, dismissed the complaint. On appeal to the 
Appellate Division, held, reversed. The subsidiary's majority shareholder 
owes its minority shareholders a fiduciary duty not to part with all or 
nearly all the tax benefit resulting from a consolidated return; since the 
agreement between the parent (majority shareholder) and the subsidiary 
violates this obligation, the allocation agreement is unenforceable. Case v. 
New York Cent. R.R., 19 App. Div. 2d 383, 243 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1963). 
The consolidated return permits a group of corporations to be taxed 
on their consolidated taxable income, thereby representing only the results 
of the operations of the group after eliminating inter-company profits 
and losses.4 A second important advantage is that a profit-making corpora-
tion's taxable income may be lessened by the amount of another corpora-
tion's losses, thereby reducing their combined tax liability. Section l.?52 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 19545 offers several possible systems of 
1 See !NT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 1501-04. Section 1503(a) is the only section noted here 
which was altered by the 1964 Revenue Act. The special 2% tax on corporations filing a 
consolidated return was abolished. Revenue Act of 1964, § 234(a), 78 Stat. 19. Due to 
§ 1503(a)(C), however, railroads were and have remained exempt from the 2% tax. 
2 Parent was lessee of subsidiary's railroad. It paid all maintenance and operating 
expenses of the railroad and in addition paid to the subsidiary 40% of gross earnings. The 
court noted that subsidiary enjoyed a "practically guaranteed taxable income into the 
indefinite future." Parent, on the other hand, could avail itself of not only its operating 
losses, but also those of its other affiliates. The court gave no figures concerning parent's 
losses, but it concluded that parent was assured of operating at a loss. 
3 In actuality, the subsidiary allocated $3,556,992.15 to the parent from the total 
savings of $3,825,717.43. The net saving remaining with the subsidiary was $268,725.28. 
Eighty percent of that went to parent as stockholder, so that only $53,751.05, or less than 
1.5% of the total savings, accrued to the minority shareholders. 
4 BrrTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 67 (1959). 
5 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1552. This section suggests four possible systems of tax 
liability allocation among members of a group filing a consolidated return. The method 
chosen in the first consolidated return filed must be followed in subsequent years. · · 
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allocating tax liability among the members, but suggests no method of tax 
credit allocation.6 Therefore, in the absence of agreement by the parties, 
the corporation whose tax liability is reduced retains the savings. A 
corporation with a wholly-owned subsidiary receives all the tax benefit 
either directly, ff its liability is reduced, or indirectly, as the subsidiary's 
sole stockholder, if the subsidiary's liability is diminished. However, when 
the parent does not wholly own the subsidiary, and the subsidiary's tax 
liability is lessened, the parent will normally share the savings with the 
minority shareholders. The 1954 Code, by lowering the affiliation test for 
consolidated returns from ninety-five to eighty percent ownership by a 
common parent,7 enlarged the number of minority interests affected by 
consolidated returns and increased benefit distribution problems.8 In 
order to avoid sharing benefits with minority stockholders, parent corpora-
tions sometimes make allocation agreements with the subsidiaries which 
provide for payment of the tax benefit to the parent. Since the parent 
owns eighty percent or more of the voting stock of the subsidiary, minority 
stockholders generally have no voice in deciding whether to file a con-
solidated return or in drafting the allocation agreement. Apprehension 
that parents might violate their fiduciary duty while in such a dominant 
position has caused several courts to scrutinize these agreements, holding 
unenforceable those whose practical consequence channels all tax benefits 
to the dominant corporation.9 
Two attacks can be made on such agreements; both ultimately are 
designed to test the equitability of the tax benefit allocation. First, payment 
of the subsidiary's tax benefits to its majority shareholder may constitute 
an illegal dividend. Second, the payment may violate the fiduciary duty 
which the majority owe the minority stockholders. The initial premise of 
the illegal dividend theory is the accepted principle that all stockholders 
of the same class are entitled to share equally in profit distribution accord-
ing to the number of shares held by each.10 Discriminatory dividends are 
6 Justice Jackson, dissenting from the granting of a rehearing in Western Pac. R.R. 
v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 277 (1953), asserted that the legislative intent was to 
provide salvage for the losing corporation and not profit for a corporation sustaining no 
loss. 
7 INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 1504. The previous requirement of 95% ownership is found 
in INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 14l(d). 
8 See BITTKER, op. cit. supra 'note 4, at 69; CuDDIHY, Consolidated Returns, N.Y.U. 
16TH INST. ON FED. TAX 351, 358 (1958); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1954). 
The importance of the consolidated return is evident from these figures from the fiscal 
year 1955-1956; although only 2,900 consolidated returns were filed, the tax liability of the 
taxpayers involved was .$2.8 billion, almost 13% of the aggregate corporate tax liability 
that year. BITTKER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 68. 
9 See Alliegro v. Pan Am. Bank, 136 So. 2d 656 (Fla. App. 1962), afj'd, 149 So. 2d 45 
(Fla. 1963); principal case at 387, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 623. 
10 E.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogart, 250 U.S. 483 (1918); Penfield v. Davis, 105 F. Supp. 
292 (N.D. Ala. 1952), afj'd, 205 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1953); Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry. v. 
United States, 20 F. Supp. 483 (W.D. Ky. 1937), appeal dismissed, 97 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 
1938). 
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illegal, rectifiable only by the unanimous consent of all shareholders.11 
Consequently, if tax benefit payments are dividends, and the allocation 
agreement transfers all tax savings to the majority stockholder parent, such 
preferential treatment among stockhold,.ers of the same class renders the 
distribution illegal. 
The troublesome link in the argument is the contention that tax 
benefit distributions are dividends. A dividend need not be formally 
declared nor even called a dividend by those authorizing it.12 By analogiz-
ing from other distributions held to be dividends by various courts, it is 
conceivable that tax benefit payments might also be identified as dividends. 
In corporate law cases, courts have classified as dividends certain wages 
and salaries,13 loans to shareholders,14' and a payment by a corporation of 
taxes on its stockholders' dividends.15 In tax cases courts are seemingly 
even more involved with identifying spurious dividends. The Tax Court, 
deciding a case factually similar to the principal case, held that for income 
tax purposes an allocation to the parent of tax benefits received by sub-
sidiary from a consolidated return is a dividend.16 Analogically, support 
has been given this holding by other courts, which have asserted that the 
following are disguised dividends for tax purposes: profits accruing to a 
shareholder from a theatre lease by the corporation to the shareholder at 
a low rental,17 the sale of property by a corporation to a shareholder at a 
price substantially below market value,18 and payment by the corporation 
of premiums on a stockholder's life insurance policy.19 The difficulty with 
analogizing from tax cases is that even if a tax credit payment is a dividend 
for tax purposes, it may not be a dividend for corporate law purposes.20 
However, because courts deciding corporate cases have been willing to 
disregard form and acknowledge various distributions as spurious dividends, 
it seems apparent that, where justice requires, most profit distributions 
classified as dividends for tax purposes could also be so identified for 
11 Speier Co. v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 1020 (Ct. Cl. 1935); Alliegro v. Pan Am. Bank, 
136 So. 2d 656 (Fla. App. 1962), afj'd, 149 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1963); Scott v. P. Lorillard Co., 
108 N.J. Eq. 153, 154 Atl. 515 (Ch. 1931); see 11 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5352 
(perm ed. rev. repl. 1958). 
12 See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 239 (1946); 11 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 11, 
§ 5350. 
13 De Martini v. Scavenger's Protective Ass'n, 3 Cal. App. 691, 40 P.2d 317 (1935); 
Prater v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 440, 288 S.W. 342 (1926); Shaw v. Ansaldi Co., 178 App. 
Div. 589, 165 N.Y. Supp. 872 (1917). 
14 Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Becklenberg, 300 Ill. App. 453, 21 N.E.2d 152 (1939). 
15 Redhead v. Iowa Nat'l Bank, 127 Iowa 572, 103 N.W. 796 (1905). 
16 Beneficial Corp., 18 T.C. 396 (1952), afj'd per curiam, 202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1953). 
17 58th St. Plaza Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. 
denied, 344 U.S. 820 (1952). 
18 Elizabeth Susan Strake Trust, 1 T.C. 1131 (1943). 
10 Paramount-Richards Theatres v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1946). 
20 See WARREN &: SURREY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 123 (1963), in which the authors 
declare that a distribution may be a dividend for tax purposes although not a formal 
dividend as far as state corporation law is concerned. 
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corporate law purposes.21 To that extent, tax cases should have analogical 
value. Drawing support from the ~pparent willingness of the courts, 
evidenced in both corporate and tax law cases, to conceptualize profit 
distributions as dividends, a court may maintain that tax benefit payments 
are dividends when it believes the allocation agreement forced upon the 
minority is inequitable. Therefore, an agreement to pay all of a corpora-
tion's tax benefit to a majority stockholder, being a discriminatory dividend, 
would be unenforceable unless ratified by all shareholders. One state court 
recently invalidated a distributive agreement on this ground.22 
The alternative attack on allocation agreements alleges a violation 
of the well-recognized fiduciary obligation which majority shareholders 
owe the minority.23 Although majority stockholders rightfully control a 
corporation, they may not use that power for their individual advantage.24 
The fiduciary cannot escape his duties merely by contracting with the 
controlled corporation, for self-serving contracts imposed by a majority 
shareholder may be rescinded.25 However, a parent (the majority share-
holder of its subsidiary) may deal with its affiliate for profit as long as 
there is no overreaching or unfairness.26 Essentially, therefore, the legality 
of an agreement between a parent and its subsidiary requiring the profit-
making corporation to pay the losing corporation those savings created by 
the consolidated return, turns upon whether there is present the requisite 
overreaching or unfairness constituting a breach of fiduciary duties. 
The lower court, reversed in the principal case, asserted that inasmuch 
as the subsidiary's directors need not act prophetically when formulating 
the allocation agreement, the bare fact that subsequent to the agreement 
the parent operated at a loss and the subsidiary at a profit is no reason to 
conclude unfairness.27 As the Appellate Division pointed out, however, 
21 See cases cited notes 13-15 supra; BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 12, § 239; 11 
FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 11, § 5350. 
22 Alliegro v. Pan Am. Bank, 136 So. 2d 656 (Fla. App. 1962), aff'd, 149 So. 2d 45 
(Fla. 1963). This case is not to be confused with the Tax Court case cited in note 16 supra, 
which held that for tax purposes an allocation to a parent of tax benefits received by a 
subsidiary from a consolidated return is a dividend. The Florida case held the allocation 
to be a dividend for corporate law purposes, requiring ratification by all shareholders 
before being legal because of its discriminatory distribution. 
23 E.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogart, 250 U.S. 483 (1918); Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 
173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955); Seventeen Stones Corp. v. General 
Tel. Co., 204 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 
N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919); see BERLE, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV, 
L. REv. 1049 (1931). 
24 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939); Seventeen Stones Corp. v. General Tel. 
Co., supra note 23; Rank Organization Ltd. v. Pathe Labs., 33 Misc. 2d 748, 227 N.Y.S.2d 
562 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., supra note 23. 
25 Consol. Rock Co. v. Dubois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Ripley v. International Rys. of 
Central America, 8 N.Y.2d 430, 171 N.E.2d 443, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1962); see HENN, 
CORPORATIONS § 241 (1961). 
26 Western Pac. R.R. v. Western Pac. R.R., 197 F.2d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 1952), rehearing 
denied, 206 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 910 (1953). 
27 Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 232 N.Y.S.2d 702, 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962), rev'd, principal 
case. 
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no element of prophecy was required to foresee that profits and losses were 
going to fall as they did. Where it is legitimately questionable who will 
benefit from the agreement, the lower court's argument appears sound.28 
Nevertheless, because of a parent's dominance over its subsidiary, courts 
probably will require clear evidence of the initial unpredictability as to 
which party would benefit from the agreement if in fact the agreement 
proves to be overwhelmingly in favor of the dominant party. 
The dissent in the principal case reasoned that because minority share-
holders were no worse off than before the consolidated return and alloca-
tion agreement-the money flowing to parent would have gone to the 
Interna! Revenue had the parent-subsidiary agreement not been concluded 
-there was no violation of the fiduciary duty owed them. In fact, the 
minority received a small percentage of the tax savings. This argument, 
however, seems fallacious, for there need not be an absolute dollar loss to 
minority shareholders before the majority will be deemed to have breached 
its duty. Tax savings constitute an increase in the subsidiary's net profits, 
and by placing itself in a disproportionately advantageous position with 
respect to allocation of the profits, the majority violated its fiduciary duty.211 
Taking into consideration the percentage of total distributable income 
allocated to minority stockholders, the loss was real and substantial. If the 
creation of the tax benefit were totally attributable to the parent, such 
savings would rightfully belong to it. As both majority and dissenting 
opinions in the principal case attested, however, the parent and subsidiary 
were both essential parties, each having something of value to contribute 
to the realization of the tax credit. It would seem basically unfair in such a 
situation to permit the accrual of all or nearly all the tax benefit to only 
one party. · 
The court in the principal case did not suggest a proper distribution of 
tax benefits. Finding the allocation agreement unenforceable, it returned 
the savings to the initial beneficiary, the subsidiary. This solution did not 
deprive the parent of a substantial share of the benefit, since eighty percent 
would accrue to the parent as a stockholder of the subsidiary. Nevertheless, 
according to such a distributive system, the parent is rewarded only as a 
stockholder and not as an essential participant in the consolidated return. 
It might be argued that the following is a more reasonable method of 
tax benefit distribution. Since both parties are essential to create the tax 
credit, it might be argued theoretically that since both the parent (losing 
party) and the subsidiary (profit-making party) are equally valuable in 
creating the tax benefit, each should receive fifty percent of the savings 
28 See Blaustein v. Pan Am. Petroleum&: Transport Co., 293 N.Y. 281, 304, 56 N.E.2d 
705, 715 (1944); Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 232, 43 N.E.2d 19, 20 (1942); Costello v. 
Costello, 209 N.Y. 252, 262, 103 N.E. 148, 152 (1913). 
29 See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939); Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western 
Pac. R.R. Co., 197 F.2d 994, 1004 (9th Cir. 1952), rehearing denied, 206 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 
1958), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 910 (1953); Gaines v. Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 340, 67 S.E.2d 
850 (1951). 
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for its part1C1pation in achieving the saving. Even with this allocation 
based on the indispensability of the two corporations' participation in the 
consolidated return, the parent would still have an eighty-percent stock-
holder's interest in the benefits accruing to its subsidiary.30 The result is 
that the parent would have a ninety-percent interest in the savings and the 
subsidiary's minority shareholders a ten-percent interest. A scheme which 
deprives the subsidiary's minority stockholders of any right to the con-
solidated return benefits is obviously inequitable because the subsidiary 
corporation is thus deprived of sharing in the tax savings it played an 
essential role in creating. This was in essence the effect of the allocation 
agreement in the principal case, which the court correctly held unenforce-
able. Courts may rely on the illegal dividend theory or find a violation of a 
fiduciary obligation; but regardless of approach, they are not likely to 
enforce allocation agreements which require all or nearly all tax savings of 
subsidiaries to accrue to losing parent corporations. 
Thomas B. Ridgley 
30 See INT. REv. ConE oF 1954, § 1504. 
